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In this paper, using recently completed “poverty maps” for Cambodia, Ecuador, and 
Madagascar, we simulate the impact on poverty of transferring an exogenously given budget to 
geographically defined sub-groups of the population according to their relative poverty status.  
We find large gains from targeting smaller administrative units, such as districts or villages.  
However, these gains are still far from the poverty reduction that would be possible had the 
planners had access to information on household level income or consumption.  Our results 
suggest that a useful way forward might be to combine fine geographic targeting using a 
poverty map with within-community targeting mechanisms. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
 
  Public policies in developing countries are often articulated in terms of poverty 
reduction objectives.  Resources for such purposes are invariably scarce relative to the number 
and magnitude of competing claims.   Spending priorities must be defined, and it is often 
desirable to target social transfers to those beneficiaries whose needs are most urgent.  Coady 
and Morley (2003) survey experience with such targeted transfer programs and show that 
errors of inclusion and exclusion are unavoidable consequences of such targeting efforts.   
Efforts aimed at improving targeting of public spending generally focus on reducing either one, 
or sometimes both, of these types of errors. 
  Because the precise economic circumstances of households can be difficult to ascertain 
it is not easy to define who should be eligible to receive a government transfer.  Nor is it 
straightforward to design an administrative mechanism to ensure that the transfer actually 
reaches the intended beneficiary.  In practice governments often exploit geographic variability 
in the design of targeting schemes:  poverty is typically thought to be more concentrated in 
some areas of a country than others and most countries have an administrative structure that 
disaggregates to different levels.  For example, the central government, located in the capital 
city, may rely on state or provincial governments to implement government policies at the state 
or province level.  These administrations might rely, in turn, on counties or districts, which 
may themselves rely on yet lower levels of administration.  Resources aimed at poverty 
reduction can thus be directed to those localities where poverty is concentrated and 
administration of these transfer schemes can be carried out at the relevant local level.   4
  Despite their intuitive appeal, transfer schemes that target poor communities remain 
difficult to design.  One of the difficulties concerns information on the spatial distribution of 
poverty.  In many developing countries there is now a good deal of experience with methods to 
conceptualize, measure, and analyze poverty.  Yet most of the empirical evidence that has been 
brought to bear on this topic tends to be at the national level.  This is primarily due to the fact 
that data on incomes or consumption expenditures, which serve as prime input into the 
quantitative analysis of poverty, tend to derive from sample surveys of households.  The 
sample size of such surveys is often rather small.  This implies that statements about the spatial 
distribution of poverty can generally refer only to very broad geographic breakdowns.  It is not 
uncommon, for example, for surveys to be “representative” only for urban and rural areas of a 
country, in combination with perhaps a very crude geographical breakdown of the country into 
broad regions (north/south or hills/plains).  While there is a general suspicion in many 
countries that poverty occurs in geographic “pockets” that are defined fairly precisely, sample 
surveys do not readily allow one to confirm or refute such notions.
2  
  Absent detailed information on poverty outcomes at the local level, policymakers 
interested in targeting transfers to the local level have often sought to use proxy indicators of 
local poverty outcomes.  For example, the Microregions program that is being contemplated by 
SEDESOL (Ministry of Social Development) in Mexico is proposing to deliver social services 
and to promote productive investment projects in a set of municipalities that have been selected 
on the basis of a marginality index produced at the municipality level by CONAPO (de Janvry, 
Sadoulet, Calva and Solaga, 2003). This index is based on a set of simple variables taken from 
the population census, and is believed to be correlated with conventional notions of poverty.  
                                                 
2 However, recent research shows that beliefs regarding the existence of  such “pockets of homogeneous poverty” may not always be 
true.  Elbers et al. (2004) demonstrate that small communities in three developing countries are found to vary markedly from one   5
When such proxy indicators are used for targeting instead of explicit poverty estimates, there is 
mis-targeting both due to the targeting errors described above and due to problems with the 
proxy welfare index at the community level.
3 
  In recent years there has been growing experience with the development of “poverty 
maps” that explicitly estimate consumption or income-based welfare outcomes at the local 
level.
4  This approach involves imputing consumption or income at the unit-record level into 
the population census based on a set of regression models estimated from household survey 
data.  The imputed household-level income or consumption estimates are then aggregated into 
welfare indices (including but not confined to poverty measures) at different levels of 
geographic aggregation.  While there is inevitably a degree of statistical error associated with 
these welfare indices, this uncertainty can be quantified, and it is not uncommon to find that 
the method produces reliable estimates of poverty for communities comprised of only 1,000-
5,000 households on average.
5 
  This paper asks to what extent the high degree of spatial disaggregation offered by such 
poverty maps in three different countries can help to improve targeting schemes aimed at 
reducing poverty.  In this sense, the paper closely builds on the earlier analysis in Ravallion 
(1993) who finds that spatial disaggregation to the broad regional level in Indonesia – the 
lowest level at which household survey data provide reliable estimates of poverty – improves 
targeting but only to a modest extent.  As in Ravallion (1993), we consider the distribution of a 
hypothetical budget to a country’s population, assuming that we have no information about the 
poverty status of this population other than the geographic location of residence and the level 
                                                                                                                                                          
another in terms of the degree of inequality they exhibit and that there should be no presumption that inequality is less severe in poor 
communities. 
3 For an example of the latter, see Hentschel et al. (2000). 
4  Hentschel et al, 2000, and Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2002, 2003 describe the basic methodology.  At present, the methodology 
has been implemented or is in the process of being implemented in some 30 developing countries.  For further details see the website:   6
of poverty in each location.  As a benchmark case with which to compare our results, we make 
the extreme assumption of no knowledge whatsoever about the spatial distribution of poverty – 
in which case our given budget is distributed uniformly to the entire population.  We set up a 
series of comparisons to this benchmark, where we assume knowledge about poverty levels for 
administrative units with progressively smaller populations.  For a given level of 
disaggregation, we ask how knowledge about poverty outcomes across regions can be 
incorporated into the design of a transfer scheme so as to improve the overall targeting 
performance relative to the benchmark case.  We consider a variety of transfer schemes that 
make use of this knowledge in different ways.  The schemes range from simple, intuitive 
transfer schemes to more sophisticated ones, in the latter of which expected poverty at the 
national level is minimized given the information and budget constraints.  We are interested in 
comparing performance across schemes, as well as the relative performance of each scheme at 
alternative levels of disaggregation.  We consider performance in terms of the squared poverty 
gap – a measure of poverty that increases not only with the number of people below the 
poverty line but is also particularly sensitive to the distance between a poor person’s income 
level and the poverty line.  To avoid making strong assumptions about the exact value of the 
poverty line or the size of the budget, we also show results for two poverty lines and two 
hypothetical budgets.
6  Finally, we report how close “optimal geographic targeting” in 
combination with our poverty maps, comes in terms of poverty reduction to the hypothetical 
scenario of “perfect targeting”.  From this we can get a sense of the potential benefit from 
combining detailed geographic targeting with additional targeting mechanisms such as 
                                                                                                                                                          
http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/2473/topic/14460/. 
5 For a more detailed discussion, see Demombynes et al. (2002). 
6 We have tried more poverty lines and budget sizes, but do not present them in this paper for brevity.  For a formal discussion of 
using “program dominance curves” to assess the poverty impact of different programs, see Duclos, Makdissi, and Wodon (2003).   7
individual or household level means-testing or the incorporation of self-selection targeting 
mechanisms within communities.   
  Our simulations are carried out using recently produced poverty maps for Ecuador, 
Madagascar and Cambodia.  These countries are obviously highly heterogeneous in terms of 
their geographic location, but have also very different social and political structures and are at 
different stages of overall development.  We are interested to examine whether there exist 
commonalities across these countries in terms of the degree to which the availability of poverty 
data at the local level can contribute to improvements in the targeting of public resources. 
  We find that there are potentially large gains to targeting performance from 
disaggregating to the local level.  The benefits become increasingly evident as one makes use 
of more and more disaggregated data on poverty. In all three countries examined, we show that 
relative to a uniform transfer the same impact on poverty can be achieved at considerably less 
expense when targeting is based on the highly disaggregated poverty estimates that are 
available in poverty maps.  The gains are generally more muted when the targeting scheme 
makes only crude use of the local level poverty estimates.  They are also lower if the poverty 
line in a given country is particularly high, or if the budget available for transfer is particularly 
large.  In all countries we find as well that despite the gains from geographic targeting, our 
inability to target households directly implies that overall targeting performance remains far 
from perfect.  This implies that there may be scope for combining geographic targeting with 
other targeting methods in order to reduce errors of inclusion and exclusion even further.  
The results in this paper are likely to be of use to policy makers interested in the design 
of transfer schemes aimed at reducing poverty.  It is important to emphasize, however, that 
there are important caveats that attach to these results.  First, we assume that the willingness of   8
government to consider geographic targeting implies a willingness to sacrifice horizontal 
equality in favor of improved targeting efficiency.  In other words, the government is willing to 
accept that households with equal pre-transfer per-capita consumption levels might enjoy 
different post-transfer consumption levels.  Second, we assume in this paper that the budget 
available for distribution is exogenously determined.  We abstract away entirely from the 
question of how the transfers are to be financed.  As has been argued by Gelbach and Pritchett 
(2002), political economy considerations are likely to influence options for resource 
mobilization.  It is possible, for example, that fine geographic targeting of transfers is less 
appealing to voters than a uniform transfer scheme – and this could translate into lower overall 
budgets available for such targeted transfers than would be the case if the transfer scheme were 
uniform.  Third, we do not address the very real possibility that the costs of administering a 
given transfer scheme may increase with the degree of disaggregation.  It is quite possible that 
each unit of administration incurs some fixed costs in terms of staff, equipment, and so on, in 
order to implement a given transfer scheme.   Relying on ever lower levels of government to 
administer the transfer scheme could raise overall administration costs, thereby reducing the 
overall amount left to transfer.  Fourth, it is well recognized that the availability of transfers to 
certain groups in the population may induce behavioral responses in the population.  Those 
considered ineligible for the transfer might behave in such a way as to appear eligible.   
Households might, for example, move to those locations where it is announced that transfers 
will be directed or they can pretend that they are residents of those locations while living 
elsewhere.  It is possible that the cost, to households, of such migration or cheating is lower 
when it involves small neighboring communities as opposed to large neighboring regions.     9
Finally, we have not examined optimal targeting in the context of local political-
economy considerations or in the presence of community specific public goods as a result of 
voluntary contributions at the local level.  To the extent that the inequality level in a given 
locality represents some kind of political economy “equilibrium”, it is not clear how a 
government transfer to a community will actually get distributed across the population in the 
community.  The inequalities in power and influence that prevail in the community are likely 
to influence how such transfers are allocated.  Such factors are likely to result an 
overestimation of the impact of the targeting scheme on poverty reduction.
7  In addition, 
Dasgupta & Kanbur (2003) shows that basic results of the targeting literature can change in the 
presence of community-specific public goods, and that optimal targeting for poverty alleviation 
can lead to paradoxical results for certain values of the poverty aversion parameter, for 
example that targeting transfers to the richer community can result in greater welfare gains for 
the poor (via the increased provision of public goods by the richer segments).   
As a result of these caveats, it is important to stress that the gains from fine geographic 
targeting illustrated in this paper should be viewed as illustrative only.  These potential gains 
should be juxtaposed against the potential costs of such targeting and political-economy 
considerations.  Policymakers need to assess such programs on a case-by-case basis to 
determine whether fine-geographic targeting is the appropriate strategy. 
Our paper is structured as follows.  In the next section we briefly summarize the 
methodology and data underpinning the poverty map estimates in Ecuador, Madagascar and 
Cambodia.  We emphasize that the spatially disaggregated poverty data available to us are 
estimates, with confidence bounds, rather than actual measures of poverty.  We indicate how 
                                                 
7 On the other hand, it is also possible that the infusion of transfers into a poor community would increase risk-sharing in that 
community and thereby contribute to further reductions in poverty.   10
we incorporate this imprecision into our simulation analysis.  Section III describes the different 
targeting schemes that are assessed in the simulation stage.  In this section we also demonstrate 
how one particular targeting scheme can be viewed as optimal in terms of ensuring the 
maximum possible gains from geographic targeting.  Section IV presents the results from our 
simulation analysis, and Section V presents a concluding discussion. 
 
 
II.  Producing Local Estimates of Poverty 
 
 
  The methodology we implement here has been described in detail in Elbers, Lanjouw 
and Lanjouw (2002, 2003).  We estimate poverty based on a household per-capita measure of 
consumption expenditure, yh.  A model of yh  is estimated using household survey data, 
restricting explanatory variables to those that are also found in, and strictly comparable to, the 
population census.  The regression models consumption on a set of household-level 
demographic, occupational and educational variables as well as census variables calculated at 
the level of the census-tract or other level aggregation above the household level.
8 
Letting W represent an indicator of poverty or inequality, we estimate the expected 
level of W given the observable characteristics in the population census and parameter 
estimates from model estimated on the household survey data.  
  We model the observed log per-capita expenditure for household h as:  
  l n   yh = xhβ+ uh           (1) 
where xhβ is a vector of k parameters and uh is a disturbance term satisfying E[uh|xh] = 0.  The 
model in (1) is estimated using the survey data.  We use these estimates to calculate the welfare 
of an area or group in the population census.  We refer to our target population as a ‘region’.     11
  Because the disturbances for households in the target population are always unknown, 
we consider estimating the expected value of the indicator given the census households’ 
observable characteristics and the model of expenditure in (1).  We denote this expectation as  
  µv = E[W | Xv, ξ  ]          ( 2 )  
where ξ is the vector of model parameters, including those that describe the distribution of the 
disturbances. 
  In constructing an estimator of µv we replace the unknown vector ξ with consistent 
estimators,  ξ ˆ , from the survey-based consumption regression.  This yields  v µ ˆ . This 
expectation is generally analytically intractable so we use simulation to obtain our estimator, 
ν µ ~ . 
The difference between  ν µ ~ , our estimator of the expected value of W for the region, 
and the actual level of welfare for the region reflects three components.  The first, 
(idiosyncratic error), is due to the presence of a disturbance term in the first stage model which 
implies that households’ actual expenditures deviate from their expected values.  This 
component becomes increasingly important as the target population becomes very small.  The 
second component of our prediction error is due to variance in the first-stage estimates of the 
parameters of the expenditure model (model error).  We calculate the variance due to model 
error using the delta method (see Elbers et al 2002, 2003).  The third component of our 
prediction error is due to inexact method to compute µ ˆ  (computation error).  This component 
can be set arbitrarily small by choosing a large enough set of simulation draws. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
8 In the case of Madagascar and Cambodia, we also include regressors from tertiary datasets in the regression model (see Mistiaen, 
Ozler, Razafimanantena, Razafindravonona, 2002, and Fujii, 2003),   12
Implementation 
  The first-stage estimation is carried out using household survey data in our three 
respective countries.  These surveys are stratified at the region or state level, as well as for rural 
and urban areas.  Within each region there are further levels of stratification, and also 
clustering.  At the final level, a small number of households (a cluster) are randomly selected 
from a census enumeration area. 
Our empirical model of household consumption allows for an intra-cluster correlation 
in the disturbances (see Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2002, 2003 for more details).  Failing to 
take account of spatial correlation in the disturbances would result in underestimated standard 
errors. We estimate different models for each region and we include in our specification census 
mean variables and other aggregate level variables cluster-level effects.   All regressions are 
estimated with household weights.  We also model heteroskedasticity in the household-specific 
part of the residual, limiting the number of explanatory variables to be cautious about 
overfitting.  We approximate both the cluster- and household-level disturbances as either 
normal or  t distributions with varying degrees of freedom.
9  Before proceeding to simulation, 
the estimated variance-covariance matrix is used to obtain GLS estimates of the first-stage 




The data used in this study consists of a household survey and a population census from 
each of Ecuador, Madagascar, and Cambodia.  Table 1 presents the basics on each of the data 
                                                 
9 Rather than drawing from parametric distributions in our simulations, we can also employ a semi-parametric approach by drawing 
from observed residuals in the first stage model.  Our results have generally been found to be quite robust to the choice of parametric 
or semi-parametric draws.   13
sources, such as year, sample size, stratification, etc.  For more detail on the data, please refer 
to the studies listed in the “References” row in Table 1. 
 
III.  Transfer Schemes and Simulation Procedures 
 
The transfer schemes 
As described in Section I, we compare a variety of targeting schemes against a benchmark 
scheme which assumes absolutely no knowledge of the geographic distribution of poverty.  
One of our main objectives is to see whether, and to what extent the availability of poverty 
estimates for different geographic locations can help to improve the poverty impact of 
distributing a given budget.  In our baseline, benchmark, case we postulate that the government 
has a budget, S, available for distribution and wishes to transfer this budget in such a way as to 
reduce poverty.  However, because the government is assumed to have no knowledge of who 
the poor are or where they are located, it is unable to distribute its budget in any manner other 
than a lump-sum transfer to the entire population of size N.  In our benchmark case, thus, we 
calculate the impact of transferring S/N to the entire population. 
10    
Optimal use of geographically disaggregated information on poverty has been 
investigated by Kanbur (1987), Ravallion and Chao (1988), Glewwe (1991), Ravallion (1993), 
and Baker & Grosh (1994).  Kanbur (1987) formalized the theoretical problem of policy design 
under imperfect information, while Ravallion & Chao (1998) demonstrated how this general 
targeting problem can be solved in a computationally feasible way.
11  For our purposes, the 
                                                 
10 It could be argued that our benchmark scenario is not terribly realistic.  Perhaps more likely would be a situation where absence of 
detailed information on the extent and distribution of poverty, and absent any specific effort to target the poor, would result in a 
default situation of resources being appropriated by the non-poor (see the discussion in Campante and Ferreira, 2003).  To the extent 
that this is true our estimates of the gains from targeting, once we assume some information on the distribution of poverty, might be 
seen as conservative estimates of the true benefits. 
11 As we use predicted expenditures from census data unlike Ravallion and Chao (1988), who use observed income data from 
household surveys, we utilize a different algorithm to solve the optimization problem.  Applying their algorithm to our setting would 
yield the same results.   14
important result from Kanbur (1987) is that if decision makers wish to transfer resources in 
such a way as to minimize poverty summarized by the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class of 
poverty measures with parameter value α>1, then on the margin the group with the higher 
FGT
α-1 should be targeted.  In other words, if the government wishes to minimize the squared 
poverty gap (equal to a poverty measure from the FGT class with α=2), then geographic 
regions should be ranked by the poverty gap (FGT with α=1) and lump-sum transfers made 
until the poverty gap of the poorest region becomes equal to that in the next poorest region, and 
then transfers to these two regions should be continued until their poverty gap is equal to the 
next poorest region, and so on, until the budget is exhausted. 
Let ych  denote the per capita expenditure of household h (with m members) living in 
group c.  Assume that the government is able to provide lump-sum supports ac that differ 
across groups c.  Thus, after-support expenditures are ych + ac.  Suppose the government wishes 
to minimize expected FGT2 after transfers subject to the constraint that total transfers are 
limited by the budget S: 
)] ( 1 ) [( min
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The r
th simulated expenditure of household h in c is indicated by 
) (r
ch y .  The (linear) Avg[ ] 
operator indicates taking the average over simulations r=1,….,R (see below). 1(x) is an 
indicator function, 1(TRUE)=1, 1(FALSE)=0.  Standard applications of the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions leads to first-order conditions for optimal ac:   15
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along with the earlier constraints on ac.  Note that 
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is nothing but the average simulated after-transfer FGT1 for group c.  In other words, in the 
optimum only the groups with the (after-transfer) highest predicted FGT1 get expenditure 
support, and those that do receive transfers get the amount which equalizes predicted FGT1.    
The second targeting scheme that we compare against our benchmark case assumes some 
knowledge of the spatial distribution of poverty, but does not make use of this knowledge in 
any particularly scientific or systematic way.  This “naïve” targeting scheme was selected in 
order to contrast with the “optimal” scheme described above.  There are reasons to believe that 
implementation of an “optimal” scheme will be difficult in practice.  It is often important for 
governments to be able to communicate in a very clear and simple way how resources will be 
targeted, and this need for transparency and ease of communication may prevent governments 
from carrying out the fine-tuning needed for an optimal scheme.   
Of course, there are virtually an infinity of “naïve” schemes that could be implemented.  
The scheme implemented here is one, particularly straightforward, example.  We have 
experimented with a variety of alternative, more complicated, versions of this naïve scheme.  
We have not found any alternative that is obviously more effective.  Indeed, the specific   16
scheme implemented here has the virtue of not only being simple but also surprisingly 
effective at times.
  
Our “naïve” scheme takes the following form.  We first rank geographic areas by estimated 
poverty.  If our interest was to gauge the impact of our scheme on the headcount rate, we 
would rank areas by the headcount.  But as we wish, in this paper, to assess the impact on the 
squared poverty gap we rank by those estimates.  We have an assessment of overall poverty in 
the country.  We take our budget S and divide it by the total number of poor persons in the 
country, Np.  Our budget divided by the total number of poor persons yields the transfer a that 
will be distributed to each person.  We select the poorest geographic area and transfer a to all 
persons in that area.  If the budget has not been exhausted in the first region, we move to the 
next poorest region and transfer a to all persons in this second region.  We continue until the 
budget is exhausted.  In the marginal region - that in which the budget is exhausted - we do not 
transfer a but transfer an equal share of whatever remains in the budget to the population of 
that last region.  Note that this scheme does not guarantee some amount of transfer to all 
regions.  The scheme also implies that households will be receiving differing amounts 




   Operationalizing our simulation exercises involves taking outputs from the micro-level 
estimation procedure described in Section II and subjecting these to the simulation procedures 
described above.  To recap, in Section II we described a procedure whereby per-capita 
                                                 
12  Two alternatives that we have experimented with (but do not report here as results were not noticeably better) include a “naïve 
poverty-gap” scheme and a “naïve poverty share scheme”.  In the former we rank communities by estimated poverty.  We then 
cumulate the poverty gaps amongst the poor within each community.  We divide that total by the number of poor people in the region.  
We then transfer this amount to everyone in the community (poor and non-poor).  We carry on until the budget is exhausted, and 
estimate impact on aggregate poverty.  In the latter scheme we calculate community i’s contribution to total poverty.  We transfer that   17
consumption is predicted at the level of each household in the population census, based on a 
consumption model estimated in the household survey.  However, because predicted 
household-level per capita consumption in the census is a function not only of the parameter 
estimates from the consumption model estimated in the survey, but also of the precision of 
these estimates and of those parameters describing the disturbance terms in our consumption 
model, we do not produce just one predicted consumption level per household in the census.  
Rather, r predicted expenditures are produced for each household  (in our three countries, we 
have carried out one hundred predictions).  For each respective r, parameter estimates are 
drawn from a multivariate normal distribution that respects the variance-covariance matrices 
estimated in the survey-based consumption and heteroskedasticity regressions.  In addition, 
disturbance terms at the cluster and household level are drawn from their respective parametric 
or semi-parametric distributions.  These draws are then applied to the census-level regressors 
and per-capita consumption is predicted.  For the next r, a new set of parameters and 
disturbances are drawn and a new per-capita consumption measure is predicted.  The resulting 
“dump-file” of r predicted expenditures for every single household in the population census is 




Simulating the impact of uniform targeting 
Our baseline, benchmark, policy simulation is calculated in the following way.  Budget S is 
divided by total population N.  The resulting transfer a is added to each predicted expenditure 
                                                                                                                                                          
fraction of the budget uniformly to each household in the community.  Note that this latter scheme ensures that all communities 
receive at least something. 
13 The poverty map estimate of poverty in community, province or region c is produced from this dump file in the following manner:  
for every replication r, poverty is estimated over all households in c (after weighting by household size).  The average of all poverty   18
in the “dump file”, to yield 
) (r
ch y+ a .  For each replication r we estimate post-transfer national 
poverty.  The average across the r replications of the estimated post-transfer poverty rates 
yields our expected poverty rate associated with the benchmark, untargeted lump-sum transfer 
scheme.  This new estimated poverty rate can be compared to the original national-level 
poverty estimate from the poverty map to gauge the impact of the transfer. 
 
Simulating the impact of “optimal” geographic targeting 
Simulating the impact of the “optimal” targeting scheme is a  bit more complicated.  We 
want to equalize the following expression across the poorest locations of a country: 
∫
+ − − =
z
c c c c y dF a y z a G
0 ) ( ) ( ) (         ( 7 )  
which is z times the poverty gap in location c , after every person in the location has received a 
transfer ac. Fc(y) is the average of the R simulated expenditure distributions of c. The function 
(x)
+ gives the ‘positive part’ of  its argument, i.e. (x)
+=x, if x is positive, otherwise 0. Transfers 
ac  (which must be nonnegative) add up to a given budget S: 
S a N c
c
c = ∑            ( 8 )  
where Nc is the population size of location c. After transfers there is a group of locations all 
sharing the same (maximum) poverty gap rate in the country. These are the only locations 
receiving transfers.  
We solve this problem by first solving a slightly different problem. Consider the 
minimum budget S(G)  needed to bring down all locations’ poverty gaps to at most the level 
G/z. This amounts to transferring an amount ac (G) to locations with before-transfer poverty 
                                                                                                                                                          
estimates, over the r replications, yields the estimated poverty rate in community c, and the standard deviation yields the associated 
estimated standard error.   19
gaps above G/z, such that  G G a G c c = )) ( ( . Once we know how to compute S(G), we simply 
adjust G until S(G) equals the originally given budget for transfers S. To implement this 
scheme we must solve the following equation for ac: 
∫
+ − − =
z
c c y dF a y z G
0 ) ( ) (          ( 9 )  
In what follows we drop the location index c for ease of notation. Using integration by parts it 
can be shown that 
∫ ∫
− + = − − =
a z z
dy y F y dF a y z a G
0 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (        ( 1 0 )  
In other words we need to compute the surface under the expenditure distribution between 
expenditure levels y=0 and y=z-t, for values of t up to z. Instead of computing G(t) exactly, we 
use a simple approximation. For this to work we split the interval [0,z] in n equal segments and 
assume that the ‘poverty mapping’ software has generated expected headcounts for poverty 
lines z k/n,  where k=0, …,n. In other words we have a table of F(z k/n). Using the table we 
approximate F(y) by linear interpolation for  y between table values. With the approximated 
expenditure distribution it is easy to solve for transfers as a function of G (see below).  In 
practice we find that n=20 gives sufficiently precise results.
14  
The computational set-up is as follows (note that the numbering we adopt means going 
from z in the direction of 0 rather than the other way around).  Define b0=0, and for k=1,...,n, 
bk as the surface under the (approximated) expenditure distribution between z-kz/n and z-(k-
1)z/n, divided by z: 
() ) / ) 1 ( ( ) / (
2
1
n z k z F n kz z F
n
bk − − + − =        ( 1 1 )  
                                                 
14 Other interpolation schemes are possible. For instance, if the poverty gap is given at table values zk/n an even simpler computation 
presents itself. Often the poverty mapping software will give percentiles of the expenditure distribution. These can also be used for 
interpolation,  but the formulas are more cumbersome,  since the percentiles are not equally spaced.   20
Let g0 be the original poverty gap, or in terms of the discussion above, g0=G(0)/z. Fork=1,...n,  
put  
k k k b g g − = −1            ( 1 2 )  
The gk are the poverty gaps of the approximated expenditure distribution for successively 
lower poverty lines z-kz/n.  Let ak be the per capita transfer needed to bring down the poverty 
line to z-kz/n: 
n kz ak / =            ( 1 3 )  
We can now solve for per capita transfers as a function of the intended poverty gap g<g0: 
1. Find  k such that  k k g g g < ≤ +1 . 













) (           ( 1 4 )  
This scheme can be implemented using standard spreadsheet software. 
Simulating the impact of “naïve” geographic targeting 
Simulating the impact of our “naïve” transfer scheme on the basis of the “dump-file” 
described above is far more straightforward.  We take our poverty map as the basic statement 
on the distribution of poverty in the country.    On the basis of the poverty map we identify the 
localities that will receive priority in the targeting scheme (we consider initially regions, then 
provinces, then communities, etc.).  We calculate the amount a that will be targeted to all 
persons in the priority regions (budget S divided by the total number of poor people in the 
country, Np). We simulate the targeting scheme in turn for each replication r by allocating a to 
all persons in our priority regions (irrespective of whether, in replication r, those regions are 
particularly poor or not) until the budget is exhausted.  We re-calculate the post-transfer   21
national poverty rate in replication r.  The average post-transfer national poverty rate across all 
replications provides our estimate of how poverty will have changed as a result of the transfer 
scheme.  This expected poverty rate can be compared to the original estimate of national 
poverty from the poverty map, and to the estimate of the poverty associated with an untargeted 
lump-sum transfer. 
 
Calculating “Equivalent Gains” 
 In thinking about the “performance” of the transfer scheme we are interested not only in 
the poverty impact of a specific scheme, but also in how much more “expensive” a given 
poverty reduction is without targeting as opposed to with geographic targeting.  To explore the 
latter we apply a variant on the simulation procedures described above whereby we calculate 
how much smaller the overall budget S can be in order to achieve the same poverty impact with 
optimal targeting as with the untargeted uniform lump-sum transfer.  
 
Distance from Perfect Targeting 
As has been emphasized in section II, the poverty map cannot provide reliable estimates of 
poverty below some level of aggregation.   This is because the idiosyncratic component of the 
overall standard error on the poverty estimate becomes progressively larger as poverty is being 
measured over progressively smaller groups.  For policy makers therefore, the poverty map 
cannot be viewed as a tool to assist with the identification of, say, poor households or small 
groups of households.  A rough rule of thumb is that poverty map estimates become unreliable 
for communities of less than 1000-5000 households.   22
It remains of interest, however, to ask how much of a further reduction in poverty could be 
expected if, rather than being limited to geographic targeting of communities of 1000-5000 
households, policymakers could actually target individual households.
15  The “dump-file” 
underpinning the policy simulations described above can be drawn on to shed light on this 
question.  While this file cannot provide a reliable listing of poor households, it is possible to 
simulate the change in poverty in a given locality associated with household-level targeting on 
the basis of exactly the same optimal transfer scheme procedure described above (but where 
each household h now corresponds to a separate community c).  In the discussion of results 
below we provide an assessment of the distance (in terms of poverty reduction) between 
feasible geographic targeting (given the poverty map) and the ideal of perfect household-level 
targeting.  To the extent that this distance is large we can provide a sense of the potential 
benefit of combining geographic targeting with additional complementary targeting efforts. 
 
 
Budgets and Poverty Lines 
 
  Before turning to a discussion of results, we describe briefly our selection of budgets, S, 
and our poverty lines.  As has been mentioned in Section I, we assume that the budget 
available for distribution has been exogenously set.  As is intuitively clear, the potential 
benefits from targeting will vary with the overall size of budget, and for this reason we conduct 
the simulation analyses described above for two different budget sizes.  In each of the three 
countries examined here we identify the per capita consumption value of the 25
th percentile of 
                                                 
15 Relatedly, one could ask how much of a further benefit could one expect if, rather than being compelled to provide only lump-sum 
transfers to poor communities, policymakers were able to combine geographic targeting with, say, means testing within poor 
communities.   23
the consumption distribution.
16  We scale this consumption value by the total population.  Our 
benchmark budget is set to equal 5% of this total value, and we experiment with a higher 
budget of 10% of this figure as well. 
  Gains from targeting also vary with the choice of poverty line.  In this study, we select 
as benchmark poverty line, that line which yields a 20% headcount rate in each of our three 
countries.
17  For comparison we experiment as well with a higher poverty line corresponding to 




  Tables 2a-2c present the basic results from our simulations with the optimal targeting 
scheme in Ecuador, Madagascar and Cambodia.  There are five main observations.  First, in all 
three countries, the availability of disaggregated data on poverty can help to improve on a 
uniform lump-sum transfer across the entire population.  Targeting transfers to poor localities, 
in accordance with the optimization scheme outlined above, yields lower values of the national 
FGT2 than when the budget is transferred as a uniform lump-sum transfer to the entire 
population.  Second, the more disaggregated the poverty map, the greater the improvement 
over the uniform lump-sum transfer.  Traditional household surveys are generally able, at best, 
to provide estimates of poverty at the first administrative level.  The simulations here suggest 
that with estimates of poverty at the 2
nd or 3
rd administrative level, further improvements in 
terms of impact on the FGT2 with a given budget are attainable, and are non-negligible. Third, 
                                                 
16 The consumption distribution is constructed on the basis of the average, across r replications, of household-level predicted per-
capita consumption in the population census. 
17 Within each replication r, the predicted per-capita consumption level associated with a 20% headcount rate is identified.  The 
average across the r replications of this predicted consumption level is then taken as poverty line.  It is clear that this poverty line will   24
the gains from spatial disaggregation are attenuated the higher the budget and poverty line.  In 
all three countries examined, the benefits from geographic targeting are most pronounced in 
our base case with the lowest budget and lowest poverty line.  Fourth, while the general 
patterns we observe are similar across our three case-study countries, they are not identical. In 
particular, in Ecuador, where our focus is only on rural areas, the gains in general from 
targeting at the local level are somewhat more muted than in Madagascar and Cambodia.   
Fifth, even though our base-case low budget represents a considerable resource envelope (as 
evidenced by the sizable impact on poverty of even a uniform lump-sum transfer) it is clear 
that optimal targeting at the lowest possible level of disaggregation is far from sufficient to 
eliminate poverty altogether (see further below). 
  Table 3 considers, for rural Ecuador, the statistical precision of comparisons of poverty 
based on our alternative targeting scenarios.  While the point estimates on the FGT2 measure 
generally take very low values, differences in estimated poverty across scenarios remain 
strongly significant (Table 3).  To ascertain the statistical significance of poverty differences 
we return to the optimal transfer simulations and estimate not FGT2 values, but rather the 
difference in the estimated FGT2 based on optimal targeting at the parroquia level vis-à-vis 
targeting at the uniform, region, province, and cantonal level.  As we can see in Table 3 not 
only does targeting at the parroquia level yield the lowest level of the FGT2 across our four 
budget/poverty line scenarios and our different levels of geographic disaggregation, but this 
estimate is also lower in a statistical sense.  We can see that, in general, the estimated 
difference in point estimates is roughly 7-10 times the value of the standard error of that 
difference, even when we compare canton-level targeting against parroquia-level targeting. 
                                                                                                                                                          
not necessarily yield a 20% headcount rate within each replication, nor would it yield such a rate for average per capita consumption 
at the household level (averaging across r replications).   25
  Tables 4a-4c present the findings in Tables 2a-2c from a different perspective.  We ask 
now how much more cheaply one could have achieved the same impact on poverty as with the 
uniform lump-sum transfer, if use had been made of a poverty map in an optimal fashion.  We 
can see, for example, in Table 4a that in rural Ecuador even a poverty map at the region level 
(the level of spatial disaggregation that is representative in the household survey) would have 
permitted the same reduction in the FGT2 as the uniform transfer (in the low budget, low 
poverty line base case) at only 83% of the cost of the uniform transfer.  With a more detailed 
poverty map that allows for disaggregation down to the parroquia level, the same impact could 
have been achieved at only 58% of the cost of the uniform transfer.  In Madagascar, and 
Cambodia the savings are even more striking.  For example, in these two countries one would 
need, respectively, only 37% and 31% of the uniform transfer budget to achieve the same 




  The optimization scheme implemented above is intuitively straightforward.  But 
working out exactly how much to give to communities is not always easy to describe.  Given 
that the design and implementation of targeting schemes is often part of a political process, and 
that there is generally a need to be able to explain allocations in a simple and clear manner, it is 
of some interest to ask whether gains from spatially disaggregated geographic targeting are 
also significant when the poverty map is combined with simplistic, non-optimal, transfer 
schemes.  We describe in Tables 5a-5c the results in our three countries of transferring our 
given budget on the basis of one such naive and simplistic scheme    It is striking that in all   26
three countries, the reduction in the FGT2 achievable with a naïve scheme, in combination 
with the most disaggregated poverty map, is fairly sizeable.  Broadly, the reduction in the 
FGT2 on the basis of this scheme is similar to the impact with the optimal scheme at one level 
of aggregation higher.  For example, in Ecuador, combining the parroquia-level poverty map 
with our naïve scheme (in the base case of a low budget and low poverty line) yields an 
estimated national level FGT2 of 0.0178, marginally higher than the 0.0177 attainable with a 
canton-level poverty map and an optimal targeting scheme.  Similarly, in Madagascar, 
firaisana-level targeting with the naïve scheme yields a national FGT2 estimate of 0.0135 
which can be compared to the FGT2 of 0.0138 achievable with the fivondrona-level poverty 
map and optimal targeting.  Again, in Cambodia, commune level targeting with the naïve 
scheme yields an estimated FGT2 of 0.010 which is equal to that achievable with optimal 
targeting at the district level. 
  The performance of the naïve scheme becomes much less appealing when combined 
with a higher budget and higher poverty line.  Indeed, there are cases where the impact on the 
FGT2 of targeting with this naïve scheme is less pronounced than with a non-targeted uniform 
lump-sum transfer (see for example column 2 in Tables 5a-5c and Figures 1 and 2). 
 
Perfect targeting 
  How well does optimal geographic targeting at the lowest level of spatial 
disaggregation permitted by our poverty maps compare to the hypothetical case where we have 
information on the poverty status of every individual household in the country?  We can 
answer this question in a straightforward manner by noting that the cost of eliminating poverty 
under the assumption of perfect targeting (i.e. it is possible to observe the precise welfare level   27
of every household and to tailor the transfer received by each household perfectly) is provided 
by the FGT1 measure of poverty (weighted by the poverty line and the total population).  Thus, 
we can calculate from our poverty mapping database the hypothetical cost of eliminating 
poverty if it were possible to target the poor perfectly (and there were no behavioral 
responses).  We can then take this budget and target it, instead, geographically, at the lowest 
level of geographic disaggregation that we feel that the poverty map can support.  How far are 
we from having eliminated poverty when our transfer occurs at this geographic level rather 
than having been tailored to the precise circumstances of each poor household?  In rural 
Ecuador, on the basis of the lower poverty line, optimal parroquia-level geographic targeting of 
this budget reduces the FGT2 from 0.028 to 0.0177, only a 37 percentage point decline.  At the 
higher poverty line, optimal geographic targeting of the budget that, in principle, could 
eliminate poverty altogether, reduces the FGT2 from 0.070 to 0.032, a 54 percentage point 
decline.  Very similar results obtain in Madagascar and Cambodia (for example, see Table 6 
for Cambodia). 
  Why does optimal geographic targeting on the basis of a detailed poverty map fall so 
far short of the ideal?  In a companion paper, Elbers et al (2004) analyze evidence on the level 
and variation of inequality within poor communities.  They show that in three countries, 
including two of the countries examined here (Ecuador and Madagascar), within-community 
inequality varies widely across communities.  Some communities exhibit levels of inequality as 
high, or higher, than at the national level, while others are significantly more equal.  An 
important conclusion from this study is that there should be no presumption of lower levels of 
inequality in poor communities.  In fact, in the three countries studied by Elbers et al (2004), 
median inequality is highest amongst the bottom quintile of communities (ranked in terms of   28
average per capita consumption, or in terms of the headcount rate of poverty) and this quintile 
also displays the highest degree of variation of inequality across communities.  The implication 
of this finding is that within poor communities, even small ones with populations of 5000 
households or less, there are likely to be both poor and non-poor households.  Community level 
targeting that transfers a uniform amount to all individuals within these small communities is 
thus likely to continue to suffer from leakage.  The poverty impact of such targeting will thus 
fall short of what would have been possible if perfect targeting were available. 
 
 V.  Discussion 
  The recent literature on micro-estimation of welfare based on combined survey and 
census data offers a promising avenue for analyzing the potential poverty impact from a variety 
of policy proposals, such as geographically targeted transfer schemes.  In this paper we have 
taken recently completed “poverty maps” for three countries, Ecuador, Madagascar and 
Cambodia, and have explored the extent to which the availability of local estimates of poverty 
can help to strengthen targeting performance.  We have taken the raw census-level output files 
from the poverty mapping methodology in these three countries and have simulated the impact 
on poverty of transferring an exogenously given budget to geographically defined sub-groups 
of the population according to their relative poverty status.  We have asked to what extent 
effectiveness of targeting in reducing poverty improves as we define these sub-groups at 
progressively lower levels of spatial disaggregation. 
  We have found large gains from targeting smaller administrative units, such as districts 
or villages.  We have shown that the largest gains from geographic targeting occur when the 
overall budget available for transfer is relatively modest, and when the poverty line is not so   29
high as to classify most of the population as poor.  We have shown further that the benefits 
from targeting are most clearly discerned when expressed in terms of budgetary savings of 
achieving a given rate of poverty reduction.  We have noted, however, that despite the 
availability of reasonably precise estimates of poverty at the level of communities with 
populations of perhaps only 5,000 households, transfer schemes targeting such communities 
are still unable to achieve the kind of success that would be attainable if household-level 
income or consumption data were available.  We suggest therefore that a potentially useful way 
forward is to combine fine geographic targeting on the basis of a poverty map with within-
community targeting based on either self-selection or alternative targeting mechanisms. 
  Our assessment of targeting performance has been based on an optimal use of estimates 
from poverty maps.  There might be grounds for concern that the design of transfer schemes 
based on such optimized routines suffers from lack of transparency and would be difficult to 
describe in simple terms.  We have considered, therefore, an alternative transfer scheme, based 
on a naïve, non-optimal use of the poverty map.  We have found that while this naïve scheme 
does not achieve the same success in our three countries as the optimal targeting scheme, its 
performance remains surprisingly good in the case where the overall budget and poverty line 
are both relatively low.  On the other hand, when the budget and/or poverty line is relatively 
high, the naïve scheme we implemented can perform less effectively than even a uniform 
lump-sum transfer.  To the extent that policy makers are concerned about issues of 
communication and transparency, our results suggest that there are conditions under which 
even simplistic targeting schemes based on the poverty map can yield encouraging results. 
We would be remiss not to restate the important caveats that attach to these results.  
First, we have assumed in this paper that the budget available for distribution is exogenously   30
determined.  We abstract away entirely from the question of how the transfers are to be 
financed.  Yet the design of targeting schemes may influence the mobilization of resources.  
Second, we have not addressed the possibility of variations in the costs of administering 
transfer schemes with the degree of disaggregation.  Third, we have not taken into account the 
possibility that behavioral responses might vary with the degree of disaggregation in the 
transfer scheme.  Finally, we have not examined optimal targeting in the context of local 
political-economy considerations or in the presence of community specific public goods.  The 
results in this paper should thus be viewed as suggestive only, and should be combined with 
detailed assessments of these mitigating factors.  
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Table 1. Data Summary 
   Ecuador Madagascar Cambodia 
Household Survey      
  Year 1994  1993-4  1997 
 Source  Encuesta  de 
Condiciones de Vida 
(ECV) 
Enquête Permanente Auprès 




  Sample Size  4,500 Households 4,508  Households  6010 
 References  Hentschel  and 
Lanjouw (1996); and 
Hentschel, Lanjouw, 






Population Census  
    
  Year  1990 1993  1998 
  Coverage  About 10 million 
individuals in 2 million 
households 
about 11.9 million 
individuals 
in 2.4 million households 
About 11.0 million 
individuals in 
2.15 million households  
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Table 2a:  Rural Ecuador 
Impact on FGT2 of Targeting at Different Levels of Geographic Disaggregation 
Optimal Targeting Scheme 
 












Original  FGT2  0.028 0.028 0.070 0.070 
















0.0167 0.0110 0.0528 0.0412 
 
Table 2b:  Urban and Rural Madagascar 
Impact on FGT2 of Targeting at Different Levels of Geographic Disaggregation 
Optimal Targeting Scheme 
 












Original  FGT2  0.027 0.027 0.068 0.068 













0.0126 0.0071 0.0455 0.0327 
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Table 2c:  Urban and Rural Cambodia 
Impact on FGT2 of Targeting at Different Levels of Geographic Disaggregation 
Optimal Targeting Scheme 
 












Original  FGT2  0.019 0.019 0.052 0.053 
Uniform  transfer  0.014 0.009 0.042 0.033 
Province-level 
targeting  
(44 urban plus 
rural provinces) 









0.009 0.005 0.034 0.023 
   36
Table 3:  Rural Ecuador 
Testing for Statistical Significance of Differences in Poverty Estimates 
Comparing Parroquia-Targeted Estimates Against Other Levels of Targeting 
 















0.0167 0.0110  0.0528  0.0412 
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Table 4a: Rural Ecuador 
Cost of Achieving the Uniform Transfer Impact When Using Optimal Targeting 
Expressed as a Percentage of Uniform Transfer Outlay 
 




























0.584 0.711 0.645 0.745 
 
Table 4b: Urban and Rural Madagascar 
Cost of Achieving the Uniform Transfer Impact When Using Optimal Targeting 
Expressed as a Percentage of Uniform Transfer Outlay 
 

























0.376 0.482 0.501 0.584 
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Table 4c: Urban and Rural Cambodia 
Cost of Achieving the Uniform Transfer Impact When Using Optimal Targeting 
Expressed as a Percentage of Uniform Transfer Outlay 
 












Uniform  transfer  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Province-level 
targeting  
(44 urban plus 
rural provinces) 









0.308 0.419 0.436 0.513   39
 
Table 5a: Rural Ecuador 
Impact on FGT2 of Targeting at Different Levels of Geographic Disaggregation 
“Naïve” Targeting Scheme 
 












Original  FGT2  0.028 0.028 0.070 0.070 
















0.0178 0.0162 0.0540 0.0425 
 
 
Table 5b: Urban and Rural Madagascar 
Impact on FGT2 of Targeting at Different Levels of Geographic Disaggregation 
“Naïve” Targeting Scheme 
 












Original  FGT2  0.027 0.027 0.068 0.068 













0.0135 0.0114 0.0480 0.0348 
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Table 5c: Urban and Rural Cambodia 
Impact on FGT2 of Targeting at Different Levels of Geographic Disaggregation 
“Naïve” Targeting Scheme 
 












Original  FGT2  0.019 0.019 0.052 0.053 
Uniform  transfer  0.014 0.009 0.042 0.033 
Province-level 
targeting  
(44 urban plus 
rural provinces) 









0.010 0.008 0.036 0.026 
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Figure 1: Comparing Optimal and “Naïve Targeting in Madagascar with the Low Budget 




























Figure 2: Comparing Optimal and “Naïve Targeting in Madagascar with the High 
Budget and Low Poverty Line 




























































optimal scheme  42
 
Table 6:  Distance between Optimal Geographic Targeting and “Perfect” Targeting in 
Cambodia 
 
  FGT2 (*100) % spent on non-
poor 
% reduction in 
FGT2 
Budget= Total Poverty Gap for Low Poverty Line 
Level of targeting      
Pre-Transfer 1.93    
Lump-sum Transfer 1.47  81.2  23.9 
Province*Urban/Rural (44) 1.23  71.2  36.4 
District (180) 1.12  67.0  41.9 
Commune (1594) 0.99  62.5  48.7 
Household (2130544) 0.00  0.00  100.0 
Budget=Total  Poverty Gap for High Poverty Line 
Pre-Transfer 5.23    
Lump-sum Transfer 2.80  64.1  46.42 
Province*Urban/Rural (44) 2.31  56.0  55.86 
District (180) 2.13  53.1  59.31 
Commune (1594) 1.80  49.4  64.12 
Household (2130544) 0.00  0.00  100.0 
 
 